Experientialism

Today (as in the past) many appeal to experience, specifically their own subjective experiences as the sole and/or final or ultimate basis or criterion for justifying their worldview.¹ This is true of some agnostics, atheists, many postmodernists, most (if not all) Buddhists, Hindus, New Agers, neopagans and other occultists, of religious and non-religious individuals alike, and unfortunately many Christians as well.

There are various understandings of just what experientialism is and a multitude of forms in which it manifests itself. However, what they have in common is that they all offer "experience as the final court of appeal....The experience may be special or general, private or available generally, but it is the self-attesting character of experience which verifies the truth-attached claim."² The key concept for the purposes of this paper is the idea that one's own unique experience(s), that is, subjective experiences or their phenomenological perception of an experience they have had is the only--or certainly the final--arbitrator or determiner of truth. In other words, many appeal to their personal subjective experience(s) for the final verification of their worldview. Examples of these subjective experiences includes but is not limited to, emotions, feelings, intuition, mysticism, and altered states of consciousness.

Experientialism is the epistemological underpinnings or foundation for many worldviews. But, is this a wise approach? Is this a sufficient way to discern reality? How sturdy is it? How much metaphysical weight can it support? Can one's experience(s) carry the weight--the burden of proof--to justify the views one attaches to them or believes that they prove?

It is my contention that this perspective is inadequate, inherently flawed, epistemologically and otherwise, and thus cannot be used to determine truth. In this paper I will expound on what I believe are some of the many problems inherent to this perspective of attempting to determine truth.³

However, I must first interject a significant qualifier or caveat relevant to the topic. I am not arguing that experience, per se, is wrong or undesirable, or not significant in some sense to the question of truth, or that it does not or should not have an important role to play in the verification of a worldview. For example, I would argue that it is vital that a Christian has, in some significant sense, an experience with Jesus Christ as their personal Lord and Savior. It is not enough to simply intellectually know truths about him. One must have a personal relationship with him (see e.g., John 1:12; 1 John 1:1-3; 5:11-13). As Geisler points out there is an "important difference between the source of one's beliefs and the warrant for holding them."⁴ That is, it is one thing to derive one's views from one's experience(s)--something we all do--as opposed to saying that one's experience(s), for instance, independent of objective confirmation or evidence, is the sole or final warrant or vindication, or test for truth for these views. Though related, these issues are nonetheless two entirely different matters.

Thus, my objections to Buddhists, Hindus, New Agers, neopagans and other occultists, agnostics, atheists, or Christians, and all others appealing to mere (or only their) experience(s) as a sufficient epistemological validation of their worldview truth claims is not simply because they appeal to their experience(s) as a source for their views, or simply because they appeal to their experience(s) as a part of their warrant for their beliefs, but when it is given as the sole proof or definitive demonstration or verification of their views. This distinctions needs to be kept in mind.

I contend that experientialism is insufficient, in and of itself to validate or falsify a given worldview.

While there are numerous problems with experientialism, I will have to limit my discussion in this paper to [the following seven.

The Insufficiencies of Experientialism

Mere experience--solely, in and of itself--is inadequate and cannot verify a religion, or religious, metaphysical, or mundane truth claims. Thus, the experience based epistemology of experientialists is fraught with failings. There are numerous problems with this perspective.⁵

First, experience only proves at best that one has had an experience. It does not--cannot--in and of itself establish or prove the implications or inferences one may or tries to derives from it (e.g., the interpretation, meaning, or significance of the experience). Far less does it prove the metaphysical assumptions or worldview one attributes to it as being true. Again, one may have indeed had an experience, but that does not mean or entail that their explanation, interpretation, or the significance they attach to it is correct. As Norman Geisler states: "Since a world view is an overall interpretation of all facts and experiences, there is no valid way to use any particular experience within that overall interpretive framework to establish the overall framework or world view" (emphasis in original).⁶ This is a case of circular reasoning.

Thus no experience, in and of itself, can carry all the weight of defending a worldview based on that experience, especially against other opposing and contending worldviews. To assume so is to commit the fallacy of begging the question or circular reasoning. Without any objective or verifiable additional evidence or reason(s), there is no compelling reason, at least for anyone else, to believe the claims. This leads to our second concern.

Second, another significant problem is that experiences are not self-interpreting. It is not necessarily obvious or self-evident what the significance--if any--or meaning of an alleged experience is. Most if not all experiences are open to numerous interpretations and/or explanations of what they mean or why they occurred. Depending on one's world view (e.g., pantheistic, polytheistic, naturalistic, theistic, etc.), one can explain any given experience differently, for example, from a completely opposing world view. (Depending on one's worldview, most if not all experiences are open to one or more better, correct, best or most correct interpretations or explanations as to why they occurred.)

For example, a Freudian, behaviorist, and/or atheists or other naturalists/materialists, or Christian, could (most would) all interpret, for instance, the meaning or significance of a trance state, quite differently (e.g., as a biochemical imbalance, demon possession, mental illness, or otherwise), depending on their prior assumptions or worldview.

Hence, people can examine the same or similar experiences in question, but have completely different interpretations or explanations for what the significance of the experience is or what caused it: many which are logically mutually exclusive.

Thus, even if we agreed that an experience occurred (e.g., some experiences one had during a religious experience), we must still ask what does it mean or why did it occur?

A related issue to the former is the problem of apparently conflicting experiences. People have conflicting experiences: experiences that are (certainly appear so to me) mutually exclusive. For example, on the questions of whether God exists and if so who or what is he, she, or it, atheists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Hare Krishnas, Hindus, Buddhists, etc., all have conflicting experiences, all disagree. Which one are we to believe? Which experience is right? Simply appealing or going by experiences will not help us here. They could all be wrong, but they cannot all be right.

Thus, based only or solely on, or by only appealing to experience, no one has a "corner on the market" of truth due to an alleged experience they had. Geisler makes this point when he writes:

Now if conflicting world views such as theism, pantheism and naturalism can explain all of the facts and experiences in the world, then no one of these views can have its truth claim justified by experience in face of the others. All the views have a basis in experience and a way of explaining it. And it will not suffice to plead special case for some particular experiences over others since they can all make the same plea....There is no way within experience to mediate this dispute without arguing in a circle, and any appeal outside experience defeats the whole experiential test for truth."⁷

Third, a critical distinction must be made between what I will term real versus true experience(s).⁸ For example, one could have the experience or sensation of flying while dreaming. The experience could feel quite real. However, upon waking from sleep, one would realize that they were dreaming. Now, we must ask two entirely different questions: (1) Was the person really flying (not just in their dream, but in real life or the external world, like a bird or plane)? (2) Did the person have the experience or sensation that they were flying in their dream? The answer to (1) is no, but to (2) yes. Phenomenologically, the person had the sensation or perception of the experience being true. Nonetheless, they are mistaken.

The previous example highlights the difference I have in mind between a real versus a true experience. It would be a real but not a true experience. The person had the experience of having the sensation of flying while dreaming, but they were not really flying in the external world.

Thus, experiences can feel quite real, but nonetheless lead to (people can and do draw) false conclusions. I believe that this is the case with many religious people (e.g., Buddhists, Hindus, and so forth). That is, I do not doubt that many have had various real experiences. But, on the other hand, I do not believe that these real experiences prove their religious viewpoints. These are two completely different issues.

Therefore, I believe that it is illegitimate for people to appeal to mere experience(s)--there own personal subjective experience--to prove or legitimatize their worldview or religion in the eyes of others.

Fourth, in one sense people have the right to believe whatever they want. However, this does not entail that their views are true (or that they have the right to try and force their views on others). That one believes something to be true--based on their experience(s) does not in and of itself mean that they are true in any significant sense other than that the person in question believes that they are true. This distinction is often missed by experientialists.

Many people confuse their ability or right to think or believe what they want or interpret a given experience as they prefer, with that this somehow entails or automatically makes their view(s) true. That is, that the way they perceive them is necessarily true or corresponds to objective reality. One can believe whatever they want--that it is true--but that does not in and of itself make it true. These are two separate issues.

Thus, because something is "true for you or them," that is, they think it is true, does not necessarily make it true in an objective sense or independently of the person's perception of reality.

There is a radical difference between believing that something is true versus just because one believes that something is true, that this--the believing in and of itself--makes it true.

There is also a radical difference between that one believes that something is true, versus that what you believe is true in any objective sense. One dare not confuse the two. One may really believe that they can beat a speeding train to the railroad crossing, but die trying.

The ideas outlined above trivializes truth. In this subjective sinkhole truth simply becomes synonymous with mere opinion. Whatever view(s) one holds, it is automatically "truth." If or since some view or practice is true to or for one, then it is true simply since one believes it is true.

Fifth, although it seems that no two people can have the exact same phenomenological experience (or perception of the experience) under discussion, this does not precludes others from disagreeing with the significance, meaning, or interpretation the former proposed for it. This is a simple but silly confusion.

The only element another can not disavow, is what another individual claims, or believes the experience means or proves to them. But, everything else is open to question.

Furthermore, one does not have to have the exact same phenomenological experience as another in order to be able to verify or falsify some or all of the claims or significance that a person attributes to it. For example, I don't need to take arsenic to know that it kills people. Based on the objective evidence one can adequately evaluate the alleged experience and its supposed significance.

Sixth, some experientialists hold to the notion that one would need to know everything about everything in life or reality, or to have experienced all (or much or nearly all) that there possibly is to experience in the universe, before they could know, therefore, make any definitive, or significant or truthful remarks regarding the significance or meaning of life. This idea is greatly mistaken.

While I believe that it is true that reality (ultimate or otherwise) is incredibly complex, this in and of itself does not preclude us from knowing numerous significant facts or truths concerning it. One does not have to experience (or understand all of reality) or know everything about everything to accurately know or understand or say something truthful regarding some of reality. That is, one does not have to have experienced everything or be omniscient to have some significant knowledge.

If one does not see or grant the previous points, they are trapped in a hopeless snare. That is, if one denies that one does not need to experience or know most or all (even much) of the possible number of experiences or knowledge of ultimate reality, then they could not make any significant or worthwhile statements regarding reality. One could not make any significant or worthwhile statements regarding reality, including the claim that no one has a sufficient, let alone ultimate, experience base or knowledge of reality, so as to proclaim for the rest of us what is or is not true, or what life is all about, or the ultimate purpose or meaning of life is, since no one has a sufficient experience base or knowledge of reality. Thus, they could not make any worthwhile statement about reality, not even the claim that no one knows or has experienced everything in life or reality let alone ultimate reality or has to know it--experience everything about everything--to know anything worthwhile.

Thus, one does not have to experience, know, or understand all of reality to accurately know or understand some of it. One does not have to know everything about everything to say or know something truthful about reality.

If we had to know or experience everything in or about reality to know anything about it, no one would know or could say anything concerning it (e.g., that no one had a sufficient knowledge or experience base, a fortiori an absolute or complete knowledge perspective of or on it to inform the rest of us. Thus, no one could make any true or meaningful statements concerning reality.

For instance, I do not have to be an air conditioning expert to fix my air conditioner if I happen to know the one thing that will fix it (e.g., change the filter). Thus, in this case I do not need much, let alone all experiences or all knowledge of my air conditioner or of all air conditioners, let alone all experiences or knowledge to fix or know this one definite problem. Some experientialists are confused on this point. One does not need to have had all experiences or all knowledge, just sufficient experience or knowledge.

Most (all?) experientialists make definite/definitive statements about reality, ultimate or otherwise. In light of the original assertion one would have to be omniscient or omni-experienced (or omni-experienced) to state that one had to be omniscient or omni-experienced to know or say anything significant, truthful, or worthwhile concerning life or reality since this is a definite/definitive statement regarding reality (ultimate or otherwise). These are self-refuting or self-stultifying views.

Seventh, many experientialists rely heavily on their feelings. This aspect of experientialism is also extremely problematic.

In the appropriate context emotions or feelings have an important role to play in life; they are significant, indeed, a vital aspect of life, but are nonetheless inadequate in and of themselves to discern truth from falsity.⁹ That is, mere subjective emotions, feelings, or "intuition," unaided by reason or objective evidence, can not determine truth from falsity, reality from fiction, etc. This applies to all types of claims, for instance, religious or otherwise.

One may feel that something is true, but that does not make it so or necessarily mean that the feelings correspond to reality. One might have quite strong feelings, but be quite incorrect. They could be rather pleasing, utopian, etc. feelings, but still not correspond to reality in the objective world. For example, during the 1960's and 1970's some who were on drugs jumped out of windows or off buildings because they felt, therefore, believed they could fly. They were wrong, dead wrong. As strong as their feelings that they could fly were it did not alter reality. More commonly some feel that a certain stock is going to be a great investment, or that this time they will win the lotto. But they are wrong. Some feel they are the best at a given activity, such as the fastest 100 meter sprinter, but the facts say otherwise. One might feel that they are indestructible or immortal because they feel great or like the picture of health; thus, feel that they will never die. However, they could literally step out of a doctor's office after completing a physical, only to fall over dead or be run-over by a bus driven by an obese, chain-smoking, beer-guzzler. (So much for the feeling of indestructibility.)

Many individuals feel or felt--believe(ed)--that what they were or are doing was/is right or true. From communists, nazi's, klan's men, pagans such as Romans who persecuted Christians, to slave traders, all have "felt" that what they were doing was right. Were they? Which if any were right? Merely based on feelings, how do we decide or know which if any were or are wrong?

Some experientialists are fond of saying that something "just feels right or true." But, we must ask "just what does truth feel like?" How does one identify the true feeling of truth or rightness? What if some people feel that it is not true that simply by feelings one can discern truth or rightness? Is this feeling true?

What about two individuals who both feel strongly that something is right or true, but their views are mutually exclusive or contradictory claims? Which feeling is true--corresponds to reality? Both? Neither? How do we determine which if either is right? Note: we are not asking whether either individual feels that something is right or true, but does either of their convictions based upon their feelings correspond to reality, or is it really the right thing to do? For example, is it okay to hurt those of a different view point or those who feel it is not okay to hurt others of a different viewpoint?

What about other contradictory claims? Are all true? This might sound profound, but it is not. One can not safely cross the street with this mentality.

Solely of themselves feelings can not discern truth from error. They must be aided, for example, by reason or evidence. This is no less true with religion or religious claims than with any other concern.

Furthermore, the attempt to discern right or wrong or truth by mere feelings, without the use of logic is impossible. The very distinction between logic or reason applying or not to feelings, is itself based on logic. If logic does not apply to feelings, then if would or could apply, since contradictory statements are no longer false or impossible. This would result in statements, such as "I feel that we should only rely on our feelings" being true and "I feel that we should not only rely on our feelings" both being true, "I feel that it is okay to needlessly kill animals and that it is not okay to needlessly kill animals" both being right or true. Experientialists who solely rely on their feelings to discern truth or right from wrong, whether they realize it or not, are trapped in a hopelessly self-refuting world.

Conclusion

I believe that I have sufficiently demonstrated, in this relatively brief analysis, the glaring failures and hence non-viability of experientialism. It is an inadequate criterion to discern truth from falsity, right from wrong, and a correct worldview from an incorrect one. Without collaborating evidence or proof--objectively verifiable or falsifiable--in addition to the appeal to experience, experientialism fails as a epistemological guide to or for truth. We must have objective verification as well. Forms of objective confirmation must be consulted so that we can compare and contrast one worldview with another and discern which if any is correct. Thankfully, the Christian worldview or truth claim offers objective evidence whereby we can discern its truthfulness and compare it with the contenders (see e.g., Luke 1:1-4; John 2:19-21; 10:37-39; 19:35; 20:24-28; Acts 1:1-3; 26:25-26; 1 Cor. 15:1-20).

Endnotes

1. For a thorough discussion of experientialism see Norman Geisler, Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976), 65-81, 138.

2. Ibid., 65.

3. Significant sections of this paper are indebted to or are directly from my book Witchcraft: Exploring the World of Wicca (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996), chapter seven; and my forth coming book Goddess Worship, Witchcraft and Other Neo-Pagan Movements (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998).

4. Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 65.

5. For a more extensive treatment of these difficulties see Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 77-81, 138.

6. Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 78.

7. Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 78.

8. In one sense the distinction as I have termed it is a category mistake. More correctly, one should not speak of real, true, or false experiences. Norman Geisler remarks on page 77 of Christian Apologetics: "Experience in the primary sense is neither true nor false. Experience is something one has, and truth is something one expresses about experience. That is, experience is a condition of persons but truth is a characteristic of propositions or expressions persons make. Hence, no experience as such is true; one simply has the experience or the awareness" (emphasis in original. However, with these points duly noted, for convenience sake, we will use our terminology.

9. For further thoughtful insights on this concern see Edward J. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 76-82.