Introduction

With the increasing secularization of society, for example, the increasing popularity and influence of post-modernism in intellectual circles and among the populace at large, seems to be a corresponding greater difficulty in reaching the world with the truth. This is something that I believe that the Church must come to terms with relative to evangelism, apologetics, and discipling believers, in an increasingly post-Christian world. Some of the premises of this post-Christian zeitgeist, along with the other "isms" of the day are multiculturalism, Political Correctness, pluralism, and relativism, is the depreciation or simple out-right denial (1) of the universal applicability of the laws of logic--the transcultural validity of logic, and hence as well of logical consistency (at least in theory), and (2) its denial of truth, at least objective and universal truth--of the existence of objective and universal truth--transcultural truth, and (3) correspondingly a denial of the unique claims to truth of Christianity--as the only true (universally true) worldview or religion. In light of these views it can be rather difficult to evangelize, to disciple Christians, and to think and to teach others to think in a thoroughly or consistency biblical manner--a consistent Christian worldview, and to show the non-viability of non-Christian ideologies or worldviews.

In post-modernism truth, if it is believed to exist at all, it is relative, relative to the individual or individuals or "interpretative community" or to a certain culture, or circumstance(s), or place, or time.

So what are we to do? Just concede to the post-Christian spirit? Are we to just accommodate or acquiesce in our preaching and teaching to the tenets of the age? No. How can, how should we respond?

In light of this situation, the post-Christian, post-modern predicament--I propose a return to and a reemphasis of or on biblical Christianity and logic, and what has been termed the negative test for truth, that is, the truth test of logical consistency. In addition to trying to build relationships and community, that is, "earning the right to be heard" with post-moderns, in order to be able to faithfully and effectively, by God's grace, share the gospel and disciple and advance the Christian worldview, we must build a foundation from which we can, humanly speaking, work or build from. It is from this position that I believe we must attempt to engage the post-Christian, often post-modern mind so as to be able to fulfill the Great Commission.

My thesis is that on the theoretical and practical and personal level any viewpoint, philosophy, religion, worldview, (including post-modernism) or otherwise that denies the objective, universal, and transcultural nature of logic, logical consistency, and truth, is not, cannot be true in any sense of the term true or truth worth talking about. It is not only not true, but one cannot even consistently live it--it is not viable. To "argue" otherwise to simply to utter unintelligible nonsense. Thus, again, I contend that we must take our stand, both at the theoretical and practical level, on the non-negotiable of objective, universal, transcultural nature of logic and truth, in order to reclaim the high ground from which to share the eternal gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. Any other position, in my opinion is to take one's "stand" on sinking sand.

In this paper I will attempt to show the necessary nature of logical consistency as a minimal test for truth for any point of view (philosophy, religion, worldview). My purpose for this is to demonstrate to Christians and non-Christians alike the necessity, indeed, unavoidability of, the laws of logic and logical consistency. I believe that this needs to be done because, among other reasons, Christians who are being influenced by post-modernism are depreciating or out-right denying the necessity of logic and logical consistency to Christianity, theology--sound doctrine and as well praxis, and to show the self-referentially refuting nature of the claims of post-modern positions to post-modernists and to those they would convert to this position, and as well to encourage and equip Christians in evangelizing post-modernists. It is my contention that to argue or hold otherwise is intellectual and spiritual suicide. Moreover, it is my position that the key premises of post-modernism are not viable because among other points, they are theologically, epistemologically, morally, and practically self-stultifying. Thus, they are to be rejected.

Due to space limitations I will not be able to go into great detail about the nature and necessity of logic (the four primary laws of logic), nor present in detail the solid biblical basis for the laws of logic and logical consistency (I have done this elsewhere).⁽¹⁾

This paper will in the space allotted expound on the nature and necessity of the laws of logic and logical consistency as a minimal negative test for truth, and give practical examples of this directly applicable to the post-Christian and post-modernism predicament.

Logic

Logic is undeniable, unavoidable (in practice if not in "theory" for some), indispensable. One literally cannot not use it. For example, one has to use it to refute it. All claims against logic are self-contradictory, self-defeating, self-refuting, or self-stultifying. Thus, for all of some people's rhetoric against logic, one cannot not use logic. It is impossible to think or engage in any type of intelligible dialogue and not use logic. This is because, among other reasons, the distinction between true and false is based on it.

The very distinction between true or false or applicable or not only exists or has meaning if logic is true or applicable. Without logic (e.g., the law of non-contradiction) there would be no such things or concepts as true or false. Thus, there could be no true or false statements in the first place, such as logic is not universally true or it is false that it is applicable to a given topic. This is because the law of non-contradiction "...itself draws the line between true and false. So we can't call it false without assuming that it is true."⁽²⁾ The same holds true with the other laws of logic. As Geisler and Brooks tell us:

Logic is built on four undeniable laws. There is no "getting behind" these laws to explain them. They are self-evident and self-explanatory. There is also no way around them. In order to reject any of these statements, one must assume the very principle he seeks to deny. But if you must assume that something is true to say that it is false, you haven't got a very good case, have you?

For example, the law of non-contradiction (A is not non-A) says that no two contradictory statements can both be true at the same time and in the same sense. Now, if someone tried to deny this and said, "The law of non-contradiction is false," he would have a problem. Without the law of noncontradiction, there is no such thing as true or false, because this law itself draws the line between true and false. So we can't call it false without assuming that it is true. The same thing happens when someone tries to deny the other laws: the law of identity (A is A), the law of excluded middle (either A or non-A), and the law of rational inference (emphasis in original).⁽³⁾

Furthermore, a statement's meaningfulness (let alone significance or truthfulness) depends upon logic. If logic is not true, or applicable to the topic at hand then the a given statement is meaningless or nonsensical. That is, a statement's very meaning or meaningfulness exists only because logic is true or applicable. Otherwise the statement could or would be both true and not true or applicable and not applicable at the same time and in the same sense, since it would no longer be true that statements cannot be both true and not true (false) in the same time and sense. Thus, one could just as well say that "logic is true or applicable to the topic at hand" in the same breath as the previous statement, or "I will see you today and I will not see you today," or "one does and does not hold to post-modernism," etc. Thus, to deny logic or state that "logic is not true or applicable" only has meaning if logic does apply to the original statement. But this refutes the original claim.

Thus, any statement or claim only has meaning, a fortiori significance or truthfulness, if and only if logic does apply or is true. Hence, the claim that "logic is not true or applicable" is meaningless unless logic is true, but in that case the original claim is false, indeed, self-defeating.

One has to use logic to try to disprove, refute, or even deny it. If one must use logic in the effort to refute it, then the argument is self-evidently not true. One has only proven its truthfulness or applicability (ironically in the very attempt to refute it).

Self-Refuting

All attempts to deny or refute logic fail. They are false, self-contradictory, or self-stultifying assertions.

Terms for a statement or proposition that does not fulfill or satisfy itself--its own criterion or criteria or requirements (of acceptability) include: self-defeating, self-refuting, self-stultifying, self-referential absurdity or self-referentially refuting or self-referentially absurd.

Ronald Nash notes: "...a denial of logic has consequences not only for epistemology and metaphysics, but for ethics as well. If all predications are true, there is no difference between walking to a nearby city and walking over a cliff; there is no difference between drinking milk and imbibing arsenic. But obviously there is a difference."⁽⁴⁾

Thus, if logic is not true or transculturally applicable then now A can be non-A at the same time and in the same sense and hence the post-modern's position is now the same as the orthodox Christian's. Or, the post-modernist does not hold to post-modernism. But, even the post-modernist does believe this. They, in this case rightly, would assert, that their view is not our view--that is why we would be having this discussion with them in the first place. Nor would they affirm that they do and do not hold to the premises of post-modernism. This is absurd, but this is what follows if we deny the universal applicability and truthfulness of logic. By God's grace, we must try and help the post-modernist see the implications of her views.

God and Logic

It is also important that we understand the biblical perspective on logic. I cannot go in to detail here with the biblical data regarding logic (I have done this elsewhere).⁽⁵⁾ I will have to be content with referencing a number of influential Christian thinkers to make my point. For instance, Carl F.H. Henry remarks: "...Scripture affirms that God is the source and ground of reason and truth and that the imago Dei in which He created and preserves humanity includes rational and moral capacities."⁽⁶⁾ Henry also insightfully writes:

The laws of logic are not a speculative prejudice imposed at a given moment of history as a transient philosophical development. Neither do they involve a Western way of thinking, even if Aristotle may have stated them in an orderly way. The laws of valid inference are universal; they are elements of the imago Dei. In the Bible, reason has ontological significance. God is Himself truth and the source of truth. Biblical Christianity honers the Logos of God as the source of all meaning and considers the laws of thought an aspect of the imago.

...The pluralistic approach to world religions now often champions the need to recast the gospel in other than "Western thought forms" and in non-Western "logics," as if logic were an Aristotelian invention. Such emphases often relativize Christian theology and replace it with non-Biblical philosophy under the guise of Christian mission.⁽⁷⁾

Charles Hodge comments:

If the contents of the Bible did not correspond with the truths which God has revealed in his external works and the constitution of our nature, it could not be received as coming from Him, for God cannot contradict himself. Nothing, therefore, can be more derogatory to the Bible than the assertion that its doctrines are contrary to reason. The assumption that reason and faith are incompatible; that we must become irrational in order to become believers is, however it may be intended, the language of infidelity; for faith in the irrational is of necessity itself irrational....We can believe only what we know, i.e., what we intelligently apprehend.⁽⁸⁾

Hodge also states:

It is impossible that He [God] should require us to believe what contradicts any of the laws of belief which He has impressed upon our nature [i.e., the laws of thought or logic⁽⁹⁾]...Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true. But it is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that to be true which it sees cannot possibility be true. This would be to affirm and deny, to believe and disbelieve, at the same time....The ultimate ground of faith and knowledge is confidence in God. We can neither believe or know anything unless we confide in those laws of belief which God implanted in our nature. If we can be required to believe what contradicts those laws, then the foundations are broken up. All distinction between right and wrong, would disappear...and we should become the victims of every adroit deceiver, or minister of Satan, who, by lying wonders, should call upon us to believe a lie.⁽¹⁰⁾

R.C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley likewise note: "Biblically the contradiction is the hallmark of the lie. Without this formal test of falsification, the Scriptures (and any other writings) would have no means to distinguish between truth and falsehood, righteousness and unrighteousness, obedience and disobedience, Christ and Antichrist."⁽¹¹⁾ Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley also rightly state (contra post-modernism): "The law of noncontradiction as a necessary presupposition or prerequisite for thought and life is neither arbitrary nor subjectivistic. It is universal and objective. What is subjective and arbitrary is the forced and temporary denial of it."⁽¹²⁾

Arthur Holmes responds: "...the law of noncontradiction is a universal condition of intelligible thought. Aristotle's famous `negative proof' shows this by asking that one who denies the law practice his denial in speaking. Unintelligible utterances may be possible without it, like talk of a square circle, but unintelligible utterances hardly qualify as intelligible thought or speech. Where this law of logic is ignored, all logic and intelligibility are gone."⁽¹³⁾ Holmes also remarks:"Thinking is subject to logical laws, for I cannot contradict myself and talk sense, yet alone construct a valid line of argument. Good logic is one of God's good gifts, and it is essential to thinking in this and any world."⁽¹⁴⁾

Lastly, we note the view of Augustine: "The true nature of logical conclusions has not been arranged by men; rather they studied and took notice of it so that they might be able to learn or to teach it. It is perpetual in the order of things and divinely ordained."⁽¹⁵⁾

Logical Consistency

The idea of logical consistency derives from the primary laws/principles of logic, for example, the law of contradiction. That is, when we combine and apply these laws in an operative or functional and practical manner, for example, to ideas, perspectives, religions, thinking/theories, views, or worldviews or whatever, we are in essence looking or testing for logical consistency. As Arthur Holmes notes: "...the law of noncontradiction in logic, itself a universal principle, insists on the logical consistency of whatever we claim as true."⁽¹⁶⁾ Peter Angeles states concerning consistent or consistency: "Concepts are consistent (a) if their meanings do not contain contradictory terms (e.g., `squared circle') which mutually exclude each other or (b) if they do not contain inherent contradictions (e.g., `A thing X can be wholly in two different spaces at the same time,') or (c) if they are not outright contradictions (e.g., Adam is a male and he is not a male)."⁽¹⁷⁾ In other words consistent or consistency is contrasted with contradiction.

Carl F.H. Henry champions logical consistency as the definitive negative test for truth.⁽¹⁸⁾ Henry notes the need for an external referent to test a claim, and that a "...telling external test of universal validity and of truth is logical consistency....a logically inconsistent system cannot be valid or true. Logical consistency may not decisively establish the truth of intellectual claims, but it is nonetheless a potent negative test."⁽¹⁹⁾ Henry also points out: "The secular theories rivaling Christian theism are notably divergent and unstable. Many are self-referentially incoherent. They fail to meet even the epistemic standards or tests that their sponsors propose for distinguishing truth from untruth; that is, they cannot even justify their own basic principles by the specified criteria."⁽²⁰⁾

In Contours of a World View, Arthur Holmes remarks: "Universal laws of logic make it possible to draw logical implications so as to see if a set of beliefs leads to self-contradiction. A world view must be both internally consistent and consistent with whatever more general beliefs it accepts."⁽²¹⁾

Thus, given the minimal requirement of logical consistency as a prerequisite for a ideology, philosophy, religion, or worldview to be true, since for example, post-modernism, in its various forms is logically inconsistent, it cannot be true, that is, in any worthwhile sense of the term.

Examples of Logically Inconsistent and Self-Referentially Refuting Claims.

There are numerous examples we could cite of logically inconsistent and self-referentially refuting claims from our post-Christian culture. I am limited only by space considerations in giving examples of this.

First, I want to give some examples of "one-liners" that are all guilty of being logically inconsistent and/or self-referentially refuting. Examples include: "I cannot write a word in English"; "my brother is an only child"; "square circles"; "I only accept as true statements that are five words or less and no more!"; "I only believe what can be proven by the scientific method"; "all truth is relative"; "there are no absolute truths"; "She who thinks she knows doesn't"; and "every statement I make is false." These are listed because most of them are patently logically inconsistent and self-refuting. The problem is that many other claims that are made today are as well logically inconsistent and self-refuting, but for many people are not as obviously self-refuting.

First, what by now is fairly well known, but is nonetheless a classic example of a self-referentially refuting claim is the so-called verification principle of the philosophical logical positivist movement which was held to by many leading intellectuals of this century. However, as Henry succinctly states it: "Logical positivists postulate that only premises verifiable by sense data can be meaningful or true. But in that case this very premise--itself empirically unverifiable--cannot be considered meaningful or true."⁽²²⁾ Thus, the eventual discarding of the verification principle.

Second, the famous philosopher of science, W.V.O. Quine, with his theory of "pragmatic holism" claims that "no statement is immune to revision." However, if this statement is true then it too is not immune to or from revision. One revision of it is that "some statements are immune to revision." But, this contradicts the original claim of Quine. Quine's claim is self-refuting.

Third, Larry Laudan, author of among other works, Progress and Its Problems and Science and Values espouses a number of self-refuting ideas. For instance, Laudan claims that Charles Sanders Peirce's view that science is self-correcting is "simply incorrect" and uses examples from the history of science in an attempt to prove that Peirce is wrong.⁽²³⁾ However, Laudan has stated that: "Determinations of truth and falsity are irrelevant to the acceptability or the pursuitability of [scientific] theories and research traditions."⁽²⁴⁾ But, based on his own theory, Laudan blatantly contradicts himself. That is, if the issue of truth or falseness is irrelevant to scientific theories, then according to Laudan's own theory, Peirce cannot be "simply incorrect," nor can any of the other individuals or theories that Laudan corrects be incorrect.⁽²⁵⁾ In fact, much of Laudan's writings are "correcting" what he sees as incorrect or false scientific theories. Thus, some of Laudan's key views are self-refuting; therefore, they cannot be true.

Fourth, Jung Min Choi and John W. Murphy make a number of strong claims in their essay, "Skepticism, Nihilism, Amorality, and Anarchy: the Legacy of PC?"⁽²⁶⁾ For example, they contend that "truth" is community contingent or dependent, or in other words that truth is relative to an "interpretative community," that there is no objective or universal or transcultural truth (except tolerance it is inconsistently claimed), or point of reference whereby one can correct or judge notions of right and wrong or true and false. However, if these and other related views are really true, then this possesses some real problems for Choi and Murphy's perspectives.

For example, if what they are saying is correct, then (1) why are they trying to tell or convince us? That is, if truth is relative, then it is relative--their views are true for them, but not necessarily true for us (since, e.g., we are not part of their "interpretive community"). And if it is not true for us, or our truth, then why are they bothering us or trying to convince us of their position? Since we are not part of their "interpretative community" they ought to be tolerant and not bother us.

(2) Who told them that truth was relative? How do they know this? That is, how did they get this perspective, this fulcrum, or privileged vantage point or point of reference so that they know and can tell us that there is no objective truth or point of reference? In other words, how can they have the point of reference to tell us that there is no objective point of reference? These are self-stultifying, self-referentially refuting claims.

(3) If all truth is relative or relative to an individual or "interpretative community," then in some communities, such as mine, these ideas are not true (i.e., they are not true in or for my or our "interpretative community"). Thus, why should we believe or even listen to their ideas, unless they believe that these concepts are transculturally true for our community as well. But, this contracts their original claims!⁽²⁷⁾

(4) In our "interpretative community" we interpret Choi and Murphy's claims differently than in their "interpretative community," that is, then one that holds to relativism. How we interpret it, or what it means to us, is that other people in other communities have a right to think or believe what they want, including holding to false ideas as long as they do not force these views on others. However, this idea--that follows from the original one--contradicts Choi and Murphy's claims.

(5) If all views are held to be equally valid, at least for a given community or communities that hold to given views under discussion, then why is ours wrong or if not wrong, at least in need of correction? Again, if our view is valid too, then why are they trying to convince us that we ought to accept theirs?

(6) If "all norms are mediated by interpretation, like all other phenomena," then doesn't this apply to Choi and Murphy's views too? By their own criterion, their views only follow from their own interpretative grid or community and thus only apply to themselves and not to others outside their interpretive community. To finish the above quoted sentence, "the issue arises of whose standards should be followed"? The answer in the context of Choi and Murphy's views would or should be only the standards of a given interpretive community should be applied to that community. But, if a given interpretive community does not accept Choi and Murphy's interpretive grid, then the latter's position should not be applied to the former. Choi and Murphy's views here too are self-refuting.

(7) If "any version of truth that is accorded a universal status is in danger of becoming repressive,"⁽²⁸⁾ would this not also apply to PC? That is, is it not held that PC is universally applicable, that it applies to all eras and communities within those respective eras? If not then why are Choi and Murphy arguing for it? Or are they only arguing for it in their interpretive community? If so, then why are they writing for us? And if this dictum is true, or more correctly PC speaking, is "a modality of praxis," then PC "is in danger of becoming repressive."

(8) Choi and Murphy claim that because "the existence of numerous relations (peripheries) is recognized, none of them automatically lose validity. Rather, more options gain legitimacy, which does not discredit the ones that existed first, unless some ultimate telos or grand purpose is thought to regulate knowledge and order."⁽²⁹⁾ Since Choi and Murphy do not believe that the latter exists, that is, there is no ultimate telos or ultimate purpose regulating knowledge and order, then it should follow that they are open and accepting of, or at least acknowledge and allow for the legitimate right of existence of boundaries or interpretive communities outside of their own, even those which strongly disagree with their own. Thus, are Choi and Murphy really open to those who directly disagree with their views? The existence of their writing itself attests to the fact that they are not. What about Hitler's Nazi Germany, or repressive regimes in existence today?⁽³⁰⁾ After all "none of them automatically lose validity"! I serious doubt it. I do not believe that Choi and Murphy would really attempt to see that these divergent views would be "juxtaposed and joined at the intersection of their differences."⁽³¹⁾ Once again Choi and Murphy's views are self-refuting.

The views of Choi and Murphy under discussion are logically inconsistent, are self-stultifying, and therefore are to be rejected. They are not true (other than in the sense that some people think these views are true) as far as corresponding to reality in this "interpretative community" or in any other "interpretative community."

These examples and many others that could be cited illustrate the point that logically inconsistent views cannot be true in any sense of the word worth living.

Conclusion

I believe that, from the biblical perspective and otherwise, it has been sufficiently shown that views that are logically inconsistent and that are therefore self-referentially refuting are not--cannot be true. Not only are they not true, but one cannot even consistently apply or live out these ideas; they are not viable. Furthermore, I believe that by God's grace, if the Church is to faithfully and effectively evangelize, disciple, defend the faith, influence the world, and do all things to the honor and glory of God (including to think), in this post-Christian world, then we must reexamine all our presuppositions on the basis of the biblical teaching and test all alleged truth claims in light of Scripture and logical consistency. I believe that both theoretically and practically, this is the only way to go. While a view is not necessarily true just because it is logically consistent, it cannot be true if it is inconsistent. It is time that we reclaim this world, including our minds, knowledge and truth (2 Cor. 10:3-5), for Christ--the Logos--the incarnate and consistent Truth.

Endnotes

1. See the author's unpublished outline, GOD and Logic rev. ed. (Santa Ana, CA: Apologetics Information Ministry, 1998).

2. Norman L. Geisler and Ronald M Brooks, Come Let Us Reason: An Introduction to Logical Thinking (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1990), 16.

3. Ibid.

4. Ronald Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1982), 105. Gordon Clark is in complete agreement with Nash. Also see 105-07.

5. See note 1.

6. Carl F.H. Henry, Towards a Recovery of Christian Belief (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1990), 107.

7. Ibid., 110. Also see 80.

8. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols., reprint (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 1:83-84.

9. For an excellent discussion of the relationship of biblical truths and revelation to the laws of thought or logic, consult Norman Geisler's tape "The Relation of Logic and Christian Theology," (Dallas: Quest Tapes, n/d). Also consult R.C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), 72-82.

10.Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1:51-53.

11. Sproul, R.C., John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley. Classical Apologetics, 82.

12. Ibid., 80. Also see 72-82.

13. Arthur F. Holmes, Contours of a World View (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 48. Also see 51, 52, 131.

14. Ibid., 131.

15. Augustine, as quoted in Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man, 103.

16. Holmes, 51. Also see 52.

17. Peter A. Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1981), s.v. "consistent."

18. Henry, 52-53, 86-90, 91-92, 111. Holmes shares the same emphasis on logic and logical consistently in choosing among worldviews (see, e.g., 48, 51-52, 131).

19. Henry, 53.

20. Ibid., 45-46.

21. Holmes, 52.

22. Henry, 52. Also see James F. Harris, Against Relativism: A Philosophical Defense of Method (Chicago: Open Court, 1992), 6, 114, 195 (note 12); and Nash, Worldviews in Conflict, 84-85.

23. Harris, 169.

24. Larry Laudan, as quoted in Harris, 168.

25. Ibid., 168-69, 174.

26. Jung Min Choi and John W. Murphy, "Skepticism, Nihilism, Amorality, and Anarchy: the Legacy of PC?" reprinted in Francis J. Beckwith, ed., Do the Right Thing: A Philosophical Dialogue on the Moral and Social Issues of Our Time (Boston: Jones and Bartlett), 1996.

27. Henry has a similar critique of this type of self-referentially refuting claim of relativists, 86.

28. Choi and Murphy, 420.

29. Ibid., 421.

30. I realize that Choi and Murphy disavow this examine on 429, but I believe that their objection it not valid given their position.

31. Ibid.

Bibliography