In their reprinted essay "Skepticism, Nihilism, Amorality, and Anarchy: the Legacy of PC?" Jung Min Choi and John W. Murphy¹ attempt to respond to critics who charge them and others who promote multiculturalism and political correctness with advocating nihilism, radical skepticism, and relativism among other things. Choi and Murphy contend that their form of political correctness does not necessarily entail these views, and that their conservative critics are misunderstanding them and, intentionally or not, misrepresenting their politically correct perspective.

This paper will in the space allotted briefly examine and critique some of the positions and arguments espoused by Choi and Murphy in the above mentioned essay.

It is my contention that Choi and Murphy do not successfully defend their views and those of other like-minded PC'ers, and that the radical type of multiculturalism and form of political correctness that they espouse do logically lead to many of the problems critics have leveled against their views--whether Choi and Murphy understand and/or will admit this or not. Moreover, it is my position that many of the key ideas or tenets of Choi and Murphy's views are not viable because they are among other points epistemologically, morally, and practically self-contradictory. Therefore, they are to be rejected.

Critique²

First, Choi and Murphy simply assume that they know why "conservatives" disagree with PC, the motivations or driving force behind whose who disagree with it. For example, "The total integration of outlooks desired by conservatives is impossible...."³ Moreover, of course, Choi and Murphy have explanations or rationalizations for why "conservatives" disagree with PC, and of course these are not legitimate. This leads me to my next concern.

Second, the above line of reasoning is a form of the psychogenetic fallacy. That is, one dismisses a position or argument one disagrees with not on the basis of solid evidence or reasoning to the contrary, but due to discarding the position or argument because of some real or imagined psychological state of the one or those who hold to it. For example, an individual rejects the existence of God because those who hold to this view only do so because of a wish fulfillment need (a la Ludwig Feuerbach). While the belief in the existence in God may be accounted for simply on the basis of this explanation, the explanation in and of itself is not sufficient to discount the belief in God--particularly in light sound evidence that God does exist--and at that evidence independent of one's belief in God's existence.

Furthermore, this very objection can be just as easily turned around and used against Choi and Murphy. That is, Choi and Murphy and other like-minded PC'ers only hold their position given their obsessive penchant for achieving a non-synoptic vision of the world and their desire of never "reconciling the disparate viewpoints that comprise social life...." To the point, here we must dispense with the subjective psychoanalysis and examine the pertinent objective evidence and/or reasoning for the position in question.

Third, without a sufficient point of reference, fulcrum, or perspective how can Choi and Murphy tell us that this cannot be obtained. And how did they get such a position or the position in the first place to tell us that we cannot find such a reference point because there is no such reference point? This is not only incorrect, but self-refuting. This is like the person who says that they "cannot utter a word in English" when they just did or that "no one can know the truth" when they allegedly just uttered the truth. Choi and Murphy's position on this point is self-stultifying.

Fourth, if "all norms are mediated by interpretation, like all other phenomena," then doesn't this apply to Choi and Murphy's too? Yes, it would. Thus, my their own criteria, their views would only flow or follow from their own interpretative grid or community and hence only apply to themselves and not to others outside their interpretive grid or community. Indeed, to finish the above sentence "the issue arises of whose standards should be followed"? The answer in the context of Choi and Murphy would or should be only the standards of a given interpretive community should be applied to that community. But, if a given interpretive community does not accept Choi and Murphy's interpretive grid, then the latter's position should not be applied to the former. Choi and Murphy's views here also are self-refuting.

Fifth, if "any version of truth that is accorded a universal status is in danger of becoming repressive,"⁴ would this not also apply to PC? That is, is it not held that PC is universally applicable, that it applies to all eras and communities within those respective eras? If not then why are Choi and Murphy arguing for it? Or are they only arguing for it in their interpretive community? And if this dictum is true, or more correctly PC speaking, is "a modality of praxis," then PC "is in danger of becoming [I believe that it already has become] repressive."

Sixth, if "achieving finality is impossible,"⁵ then is this the final word on the issue? In the context that this quote appears, this statement is self-refuting.

Seventh, Choi and Murphy claim that because "the existence of numerous relations (peripheries) is recognized, none of them automatically lose validity. Rather, more options gain legitimacy, which does not discredit the ones that existed first, unless some ultimate telos or grand purpose is thought to regulate knowledge and order."⁶ Since Choi and Murphy do not believe that the latter exists, that is, there is no ultimate telos or ultimate purpose regulating knowledge and order, then it should follow that they are open and accepting of, or at least acknowledge and allow for the legitimate right of existence of boundaries or interpretive communities outside of their own, even those which strongly disagree with their own. Thus, are Choi and Murphy really open to those who directly disagree with their views as found in the essay under discussion? No. The existence of the essay itself attests to this fact. What about Hitler's Nazi Germany, or other repressive regimes in existence today?⁷ After all "none of them automatically lose validity"! I serious doubt it. I do not believe that Choi and Murphy would really attempt to see that these divergent views would be "juxtaposed and joined at the intersection of their differences."⁸ Once again Choi and Murphy's views are not viable.

Eighth, Choi and Murphy define skepticism in an innocuous sense that tries to sidestep the criticisms of some of their opponents, such as D'Souza, who in my opinion rightly note that Choi and Murphy's form of PC results in a problematic or seriously flawed form of skepticism.⁹

Ninth, worse yet Choi and Murphy equivocate on the term and concept of "truth" by redefining it in a manner that fits their views, but is contrary to their opponents.¹⁰

Tenth, in several key instances Choi and Murphy appear to be guilty of double talk. For example, in responding to the charges of radical skepticism stemming from their adherence to deconstuctionism ("which is a vital facet of PC"¹¹) they state that "a correct interpretation [of a text or literary work] is truthful because it corresponds to the author's mode of interpretation," yet they also state that "truth does not have to be based on correspondence but can be defined in terms of use and disuse."¹² So which is it? Or can I simply define "truth" and "correspondence" according to my own usage? It seems that I do not have the appropriate "mode of interpretation" to make sense of Choi and Murphy.

Eleventh, Choi and Murphy seem to miss the point of their critics charges that their form of PC results in nihilism. They remark that: "Simply put, PC is not nihilistic. The result of PC is not the destruction of all values, or the elimination of standards for judging appropriate interpretations of behavior. On the other hand, however, values are no longer thought to have `cosmic support,' argue PC'ers."¹³ In the following paragraph they reference Stanley Fish with some double talk about nihilism.

While I would agree with Choi and Murphy that if by nihilism their critics mean that PC'ers do not believe in anything or do not believe that anything is knowable or that all knowledge is worthless, meaningless or insignificant, or that no knowledge is possible,¹⁴ then in this sense Choi and Murphy are not nihilist--either in the epistemological or ethical or moral sense of the term. However, another meaning of nihilism (in the epistemological and ethical sense), is "the denial of any objective and real ground or state of truth."¹⁵ In this sense of the term Choi and Murphy are nihilists. And whether they understand it or not, if we consistently apply their views, this logically and ontologically will result in ultimately destroying values and even any consistent epistemological or ethical standard(s) for determining these values in the first place.

There are too many other concerns and objections that I have to the essay of Choi and Murphy than space allows me to address. Thus, it must suffice to say that I was frustrated with there work over and over again by some of their missing the points of their critics arguments, their failure to carefully define important terms or their constant redefining of critical concepts and terms. Many times, and regarding the key concerns at that, Choi and Murphy "just don't get it." One final example with have to do.

In the section on relativism Choi and Murphy deny that their views or type of PC is relativistic or result in relativism.¹⁶ Using the writings and thoughts of Stanley Fish, Choi and Murphy try to prove that they like Fish are "relationist" not relativists.¹⁷ However, if one simply employs the standard definition of relativism which applies to both epistemological and ethical relativism: there are no morals or knowledge claims that are true at all times for all people in all situations, then it is clear, despite their protesting that Choi and Murphy are relativist. Relativism as used here does not mean that there are no values, or epistemological or ethical norms, but that there are no universally valid values, epistemological or ethical norms. For space sake and because their views are clear as to what they actually believe regarding these issues in above mentioned section, I will not belabor the point. Simply put, Choi and Murphy do believe that knowledge and ethical norms vary from individual(s), or communities or societies.

Conclusion

I believe that it has been adequately demonstrated in the allotted space that the views of Choi and Murphy do result in nihilism and relativism. While they expressly disavow these views or conclusion; nonetheless, they follow from the views of Choi and Murphy--whether or not they understand and/or will admit this.

Thus, based on the previous criticisms and other substantive ones, that space permitting could and should be mentioned, I contend that Choi and Murphy's have not successfully defended their views and those of other like-minded PC'ers, and that the radical type of multiculturalism and form of political correctness that they espouse do lead to many of the problems critics have leveled against their views. Moreover, it is my position that many of the key ideas or tenets of Choi and Murphy's views are not viable in any rational or consistently applied "modality of praxis" because they are among other points epistemologically, morally, and practically self-contradictory. Therefore, they are to be rejected. Lastly, ironically, it is Choi and Murphy who misunderstand and/or misrepresent the positions of their critics.

Endnotes

17. Ibid., 425-26.